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Case No. 20090934-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
Kelly Tyson Davis, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for retail theft (with priors), a third 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the prosecutor breach the plea agreement when he recommended that 
Defendant serve a prison term? If so, did the trial court plainly err or was counsel 
ineffective for not noting and addressing the breach? 
Standard of Review., To establish plain error, a defendant must show that 
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(iii) the error is harmful/, State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 12,153 P.3d 804. An 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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question of law reviewable for correctness. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 
R3dl62. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are dispositive in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Defendant with retail theft (with priors), a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (West 2009).l Defendant pled 
guilty as charged. R17-18; R19-25 (plea statement); R63 (transcript of plea hearing). 
In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to recommend that any sentence in this case run 
concurrently with Defendant's sentence in a Davis County case. R23. 
At sentencing, the prosecutor made the promised recommendation. R62:7. 
But the prosecutor clarified that he had not" agree [d] to recommend that whatever 
[the Davis County] sentence was, it would be the sentence we'd recommend in this 
case/' Id. Noting that Defendant "just keeps committing offenses, even when he's 
charged and on probation for other offenses," the prosecutor recommended prison. 
R62:10. 
The State cites to the current version of the relevant statutes except where 
changes in the statutes may be relevant to the claims on appeal. 
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After hearing from both parties, the court imposed an indeterminate prison 
term of zero to five years, ordered that Defendant be given credit for time served, 
and ordered that the sentence run concurrently with any other sentence Defendant 
was serving. R62:12; see also R34-35. 
Between the date of sentencing and the date that judgment was filed, 
Defendant sent the court a letter alleging that the prosecutor had breached the plea 
and asking to withdraw his plea. See R32-33. The trial court declined to consider it, 
explaining that the letter was an improper ex parte communication and advising 
Defendant that requests for orders from the court must be made by motion and with 
the involvement of all parties. SeeR36. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant entered a 7-Eleven, took some items that were for sale, and left 
without paying for them. R63:3. Defendant had two prior convictions for theft. 
R63:3-4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement. The prosecutor promised 
only to recommend that the sentence in this case run concurrently with the sentence 
in Defendant's Davis County case. The prosecutor made that recommendation. But 
the prosecutor did not agree to recommend a jail sentence and/or probation, nor 
did he agree to stand silent on the nature of the sentence. Because the prosecutor 
3 
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did not breach the plea agreement, Defendant cannot prevail on either his plain 
error or his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFEND ANT'S PLAIN ERROR AND INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE THE 
PROSECUTOR DID NOT BREACH THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement when he 
recommended a prison sentence. Br. Appellant at 10-11. Defendant observes that 
when he entered his guilty plea, "the prosecutor agreed to recommend a concurrent 
jail sentence." Br. Appellant at 10. But, he argues, "At sentencing the prosecutor 
initially stuck with that recommendation, telling the court that the [S]tate was 
recommending a concurrent jail sentence. Yet midway through sentencing, the 
prosecutor changed his recommendation and requested the Court sentence 
[Defendant] to prison/7 Br. Appellant at 10 (record citations omitted). 
Defendant concedes that he did not raise this claim at sentencing when the 
alleged breach occurred and observes that this would normally preclude review of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the matter on appeal. See Br. Appellant at 11. Defendant, however, asserts that he 
can establish plain error and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See id. 
A. The trial court did not plainly err for proceeding with 
sentencing after the prosecutor recommended prison time. 
When a prosecutor breaches his promise and the defendant objects, the 
defendant is entitled to a remedy, which in some cases may be specific performance 
of the plea and in some cases the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Santobello v. 
New York 404 U.S. 257, 261-63 (1971) ("[T]he adjudicative element inherent in 
accepting a plea of guilty [] must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant 
2
 Alternatively Defendant asserts that he may have preserved his claim when 
he sent the court a pro se letter alleging that the prosecutor had breached the plea. 
Br. Appellant at 11. "He contends that this letter preserved the issue in the trial 
court, not unlike a motion for new trial/7 Id. Defendant has not explained why the 
trial court should have treated an ex parte communication from a represented 
defendant as if it were a motion for a new trial, nor has he discussed the standard 
for a new trial. He has cited to no authority for his claim. His claim is thus 
inadequately briefed, and this Court should not review it. See State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, 
f 22,128 P.3d 1179 ("An adequately briefed argument contain[s] the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. We have held that, to be 
adequate, briefs must provide "meaningful legal analysis.") (citing Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9)) (additional citation and internal quotation omitted). 
Moreover, a represented client "generally has no authority to file pro se 
motions, and the court should not consider them." State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 
327, f 33,143 P.3d 302 (citation and internal quotation omitted). 
5 
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what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a 
constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled/,); see also State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 
222,95 P.3d 1203, f 17 ("[W]hen a plea agreement is breached by the prosecutor, the 
proper remedy is either specific performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal 
of the guilty plea both at the discretion of the trial judge."). 
But where the defendant does not object to a breach and where the error is 
therefore not properly preserved, the authority of the appellate courts to remedy the 
error is "strictly circumscribed.,, Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct 1423,1428 (2009) 
(addressing unpreserved claim that prosecutor breached plea). In the federal courts, 
relief is available only where the defendant can show plain error, i.e., (1) that an 
error or defect exists, (2) that the error is clear or obvious, (3) and that the error 
affected the substantial rights of the defendant. Id. atl429.3 
3
 In the federal courts, plain error review involves an additional or fourth step 
or prong. "Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of 
appeals has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to be 
exercised only if the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings/' Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 1429 (internal quotation 
and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
6 
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Similarly, in Utah's appellate courts, appellate review of unpreserved claims 
requires a showing of plain error or some other exception to the preservation rules. 
"'Under ordinary circumstances, [Utah courts] will not consider an issue brought for 
the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or exceptional 
circumstances exist/" State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551 (quoting State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 16, 94 P.3d 186). To establish plain error, a 
defendant must show that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT 
App 511,112,153 P.3d 804. 
Proceedings below. Here, in exchange for Defendant's guilty plea, the 
prosecutor agreed to recommend that Defendant's sentence run concurrently with 
his sentence in a Davis County case. See R23 (plea statement). That was the 
prosecutor's only agreement. See id.; see also R63 (transcript of plea hearing). The 
7 
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trial court accepted the plea and ordered that Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) 
prepare a pre-sentence investigation report addendum (PSI Add.). R63:4.4 
At sentencing, the court noted that in a PSI prepared two months earlier, 
AP&P had not recommended prison. R62:8. But, the court observed, in the PSI 
Addendum following the instant offense, AP&P had recommended prison. Id. The 
4
 In its report, AP&P recommended that Defendant be committed to prison 
for an indeterminate prison term of zero to five years. See PSI Add. at 2. The report 
noted that Defendant was "currently incarcerated in the Davis County Jail, and is on 
probation with Adult Probation and Parole/' Id. The report also stated that on July 
2,2009, [Defendant] was sentenced in the Second District Court, Farmingtonf,] for 
two separate felony offenses (Cases 081700952 and 081701935)." Id. The charges in 
these cases were possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and 
theft, a third degree felony. Id. The report referenced Defendant's "significant 
criminal history," which included three felony convictions and several 
misdemeanor convictions. Id. at 3. It continued, "[Defendant's] supervision history 
as an adult includes both formal and informal probation. From 2005 to 2007 he was 
supervised on probation through AP&P, and in 2007 his probation was terminated 
unsuccessfully. In addition to being on probation with AP&P, he is also on 
probation through Ogden District Court for a felony offense." Id. The report also 
clarified that when his probation was revoked and restarted in 2007, it was 
"restarted with zero tolerance." Id. at 6. 
The report further stated that Defendant had acknowledged his addiction to 
methamphetamine. Id. at 3. But Defendant "did not qualify for the DORA [Drug 
Offender Reform Act] Program, as his Criminal History Matrix indicates a Utah 
State Prison Commitment." Id. 
8 
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prosecutor explained that the new recommendation reflected a change in the 
sentencing matrix, which changes with each conviction. Id. 
The prosecutor acknowledged that he had agreed to recommend that the 
sentence in this case run concurrently with the sentence on the Davis County case. 
R62:7. But, he clarified, "We didn't agree to recommend that whatever their 
sentence was, it would be the sentence we'd recommend in this case." Id. The 
prosecutor then expressed his belief that AP&P's recommendation for prison was 
appropriate, explaining, "He's been given the chan[ce] of probation before and was 
terminated unsuccessfully." Id. at 10. The prosecutor elaborated, "At the time, after 
he committed the offense that he's apparently on court probation for, he committed 
this offense, so he just keeps committing offenses, even when he's been charged and 
on probation for other offenses." Id. 
The court imposed an indeterminate prison term of zero to five years, gave 
Defendant credit for time served, and ordered that his sentence run concurrently 
with any other sentence that he was then serving. Id. at 12. 
Analysis. The prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement. The prosecutor 
agreed to recommend that Defendant's sentence run concurrently with the sentence 
in his Davis County case. R23. The prosecutor made that recommendation. See 
R62:7. Moreover, while the trial court was not bound to follow the 
recommendation, the court nevertheless exercised its discretion to run the prison 
9 
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sentence in this case concurrently with any other sentence Defendant was serving. 
SeeR62:12. 
The prosecutor did not agree to recommend the same sentence as that 
imposed in the Davis County case. See R23. He did not agree to recommend a jail 
term with probation. See id. He did not agree to stand silent on the nature of the 
sentence. See id. Thus, the prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement when he 
recommended that Defendant receive a prison sentence. 
For this reason, Defendant cannot show that the trial court erred when it 
failed to sua sponte find that the prosecutor had breached the plea or for not 
granting Defendant some other kind of relief. Defendant cannot show any error, let 
alone obvious and prejudicial error. 
Indeed, Defendant's argument rests on an erroneous assumption. 
Defendant's argument assumes that a concurrent sentence is an identical sentence 
and that to recommend a concurrent sentence is to recommend that an identical 
sentence run concurrently. Defendant's claim is without a basis in logic or law. 
B. Defense counsel was not ineffective for not arguing that the 
prosecutor had breached the plea agreement 
"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate 
both that 'counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment,' and that 'counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial.'" State v. Perry, 2009 UT App 51,111, 204 P.3d 880 
10 
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(quoting State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984))). "To show prejudice ..., the defendant 
bears the burden of proving that counsel's errors actually had an adverse effect on 
the defense and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. 
(internal quotation and citations omitted). 
Inadequate briefing. Defendant contends, in passing, that he can show not 
only plain error, but also ineffective assistance of counsel. See Br. Appellant at 11. 
While he has briefed his plain error claim, he has not briefed—much less adequately 
briefed — his ineffective assistance claim. Therefore, this Court therefore should not 
review it. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring that appellant set forth an 
argument that "containfsj the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved 
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on"); State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, | 11, 974 P.2d 269 (stating that "[a] 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research") (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
11 
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Analysis. In any case, Defendant cannot show that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to a breach, because no breach occurred. The prosecutor 
fulfilled the promises made in the plea agreement. He recommended that the 
sentence in this case run concurrently with the sentence in the Davis County case. 
R62:7. But the prosecutor did not promise to recommend jail and/ or probation or to 
stand silent on the nature of the sentence. R23. 
Because the prosecutor did not breach the plea, defense counsel did not 
perform deficiently for not objecting to the prosecutor's recommendation of prison. 
See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34,989 P.2d 52 (Counsel's failure "to make motions 
or objections [that] would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective 
assistance/') (quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, because the prosecutor 
did not breach the plea, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. He cannot show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, had counsel objected to the prosecutor's 
recommendation, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
12 
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Respectfully submitted August ^ , 2010. 
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Utah Attorney General 
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THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC., 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
2562 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone:(801) 392-8247 
Fax:(801)334-7275 
UU ? o «_ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIQ COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 
&/X Z2 
Defendant. 
*/s 
JUDGE /4<f?^ 
_, hereby acknowledge and certify that I 
have been advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights; 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes-. 
CRIME 6? STATUTORY DEGREE 
PROVISION 
A. 
B-. 
C 
D. 
E. 
F. 
PUNISHMENT 
MIN/MAX AND/OR 
/Z^Cy 7X»/ih 2L. A-t/fisr*** 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN SUPPORT OF GU1L"H 
linn CD29481445 pages: 7 091901063 DAVIS.KELLY TYSON 
0019 
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^fcfe 
%<Tl "have'received a copy of the (Amended) Information asainst me. I have read it, or had it 
.^rfeacl to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleadins 
guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
<?-*«. <*-r sdLx^t^ f &/£/&•& <<4j? &&>-*& J^^pr^^^y^ &CA& 
^^t^^^c^^u^J^ /^&*-~/^A^kl-^ A^L^.J^ istjt^Z^ ^ .<*> /Z^JZLz/^ 
J^U^^^r^^^i^^ ^g>t^i>^^^i^^, ^^^^^^^^^^V^, #/ 
fc*. 
,/l£^r^ir^l^r^Lr. I&ZAJL^ ^ tZ^-jP /Z^*— &4L&4- £tS^<jC 
/0^t£*^c*rZ64L£<f d^tTV^^-t^J^/? Off &^^ 
I understand that by pleading guilty, I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that 
the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest) 
pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
S^^ ^>^Z±^L. 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the 
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest) 
I will give up all the following rights: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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COUNSEL: I know that I have the risht to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I understand that I 
misht later, if the Judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have done 
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reason: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is /uyf^^ Tu^lt^/ 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, ara the consequences of my 
guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
JURY TRIAL I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) 
jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, (a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
(b) by my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I 
choose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of 
the witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay 
those costs. 
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I choose not to testify, 
no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if I 
choose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against 
me. 
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PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or no 
contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). If 
I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and my case will be set 
for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) 
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning 
that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA 
POTENTIAL PENALTIES. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a 
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty 
for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that ^ \z dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS. I know that if there is more than one crime involved, 
the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run at the same 
time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead 
to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of 
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no 
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contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences beins imposed on me. If the offense 
to which I am now pleadins guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the 
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
_y&&s& /&^p\jgCZA— ^j^Af^Jg^sfj? /464sV ,/?s€^<r^ 
C^^^S^VfAsy/f &y' /$*e^^ $> C^fsfr? 
TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe 
the Judge may do are not binding on the Judge. 
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand 
its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements dre correct. 
0023 
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I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 7<fr^ years of age. I have attended school through the /*> Grade. I can read 
and understand the English Language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgement when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medications or intoxicants which impair my judgement. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a 
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) prior to sentencing. I will be allowed to withdraw my 
plea only if I show good cause. Once I am sentenced, I lose my right to withdraw my plea. 
DATED this r day of ^ 7 \ ^ C ^ ^ T / ^ 9.QOf . 
DEFEflQA fD NT 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNE/. 
I certify that I am the attorney for , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents 
and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an 
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the . 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, dre accurate 
and true. 
ATTORNEY FORDK^DANT 
BAR NO. _^_Z^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case asainst 
, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of defendant and find that the 
factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and 
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourase a plea has been offered 
defendant The plea nesotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea 
Asreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to 
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the offense(s) for 
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) is/are entered and that 
the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
BAR NO. /Q^£) h 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foresoins Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the 
sisnatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly and 
voluntarily made. 
It is hereby ordered that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crime(s) set 
forth in the Statement,be accepted and en^r^d. / ^ f\% 
Dated this k day of 
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MR. BUSHELL 
THE COURT: 
MR. BUSHELL 
Ogden, Utah August 6, 2009 "'• 
: Kelly Davis, number 33, please. 
State of Utah versus Kelly Davis. 
: Judge, we've reached a resolution in this 
matter. Mr. Davis is gonna plead guilty as charged to theft 
with a prior, third degree felony. The State!s not going to 
oppose the sentence running concurrent with the year hefs 
serving in Davis 
THE COURT: 
I agreement? 
MR. DAVIS: 
THE COURT: 
County Jail. 
All right. Mr. Davis, is that your 
It is, your Honor. . • 
You've had. a chance to read the plea . I 
agreement prepared by Mr. Bushell. Did he answer your 
questions? 
MR. DAVIS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. DAVIS: 
THE COURT: 
He has. J 
And you understood the document. 
I do. 
And you acknowledge that by pleading guilty, 
you waive your rights explained in that agreement. 
MR. DAVIS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. DAVIS: 
THE COURT: 
I do. 
Do you feel pressure to plead guilty? 
No, sir. J 
Is your mind clear today that your 
understand what you1re doing? 
MR. DAVIS: It is, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: You understand that the sentence that I will 
2 impose will be a prison commitment — is that what I 
3 understood? 
4 MR. BUSHELL: No, no, he's doing a year in the Davis 
5 County Jail. 
6 THE COURT: Oh, I misunderstood. Excuse me. Okay. 
7 Didn't mean to give you a panic attack, but — 
8 MR. DAVIS: Mean my heart jumped out of my chest. 
9 MR. BUSHELL: Mine, too. 
10 THE COURT: But you understand that a prison commitment 
11 is a possibility in this case. I don't wanna minimize this. 
12 MR. DAVIS: No, no, not at all, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. DAVIS: Not at all. . 
15 THE COURT: All right. And you understand that I!m not 
16 bound by recommendations. 
17 MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir. 
18 THE COURT: Factual basis please. 
19 MR. BUSHELL: Do you want me to do it, Bill? 
20 MR. DAINES: Yes. 
21 MR. BUSHELL: Okay. Your Honor, the date alleged in the 
22 Information, the defendant went into a 7-Eleven, I believe. 
23 Took some items that were for sale, pair of sunglasses, I 
24 believe, and some other items, and then left without paying 
25 for those items. He — sunglasses. He has twice previously 
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been.convicted o 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
lawyer? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
DAINES: 
COURT: 
DAVIS: 
COURT: 
DAVIS: 
COURT: 
DAVIS: 
COURT: 
f theft. 
That's correct, your Honor. . • 
Do you agree with those facts? 
I do, your Honor. 
Do you have any additional questions of your 
No. 
Are you satisfied with his-advice to you? 
I am, your Honor. 
All right. To the charge then of theft with 
priors, a third degree felony, how do you plead? • ' 
MR. DAVIS: Guilty, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Did. I unders— All right. I'll 
accept the plea and find that this plea is knowing and 
voluntary. You have a right to make a motion to withdraw the 
plea if it's made prior to sentencing. Did I understand that 
the parties were going to ask for sentencing now or get a 
presentence report? 
MR. BUSHELL: I think we'oughta do a PSI, your Honor. 
MR. DAINES: I think that's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's do a PSI. September 10th 
will be sentencing. You're held pending sentencing. 
MR. BUSHELL: • Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. DAVIS: Thank you, sir. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
THE COURT: Other matters, Mr. Laker? 
MR. LAKER: Can we call Kelly Tyson Davis, your 
Honor? No. 2 . 
-THE CLERK: State of Utah vs. Kelly Tyson Davis, 
Case No. 091901063. Time set for Adult Probation & Parole 
sentencing. • . 
MR. SAUNDERS ITm sorry? Who did you just call? 
THE CLERK: No. 2, Kelly Tyson Davis. 
THE COURT: Davis. 
MR. LAKER: I!m not sure why, but this was moved to 
your Honor, and Ifve got notes in here from Ryan Bouwhuis with 
regard to, you know, and that type of thing and—and the plea 
negotiation with regard to this. 
THE COURT: The only reason I know is, I think he 
was on probation to this Court or something. 
MR. LAKER: Okay. 
THE COURT: And so they moved him here, but--
MR. LAKER: Uh huh (affirmative). That's probably--
MR. SAUNDERS: Has there been a probation violation 
3 
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I donT t think so. 
Not—not that Ifm aware of, so... 
I don't think there has been a probation 
filed or anything? 
MR. LAKER 
THE COURT 
MR. LAKER 
violation. 
THE COURT: I think it was just referred, like a 
week or two ago. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Don't we want to get those together? 
MR. LAKER: Pardon? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Don't we want to get those together? 
MR. LAKER: Yeah. Here. 
MR. SAUNDERS: So, we can handle it at the same 
time? 
MR. LAKER: Yeah. We're handling it here, that's 
why we're here. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Yeah. Don't we want to have the 
probation case here as well, though? 
MR. LAKER: Oh,. I don't know that there is a 
probation case. He had a—he.had a Davis County case, your 
Honor, that actually— 
THE COURT: Do we have another case, Kristy? 
MR. LAKER: --happened after this one. 
THE COURT: Right. 
THE CLERK: September 10th (inaudible) said defense 
counsel represents the defendant, is currently on Court 
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probation to Judge Hadley and they requested it be—be 
continued and be heard before you, because of the court 
probation. 
THE COURT: Okay. And do we have another case then 
with it? At least they think we do, huh? 
While she's looking, is Mr. Davis in the Davis 
County drug court program at this point? 
MR. LAKER: No. 
MR. DAVIS: No, your Honor. Actually, you 
recommended in November, if you recall, back in November of 
last year, you ordered him in drug court and actually, it was 
Morris who ordered it and then you went—concurred with it and 
I didnft qualify 'cause I had a pending case. So, I was at 
Rainbow for two months, trying to qualify, and finally, once I 
was able to qualify, this one then popped up, which actually 
happened before and one I!ve already been sentenced on. 
So, . I really want to enter it, I mean, it would have 
been a good opportunity for me. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DAVIS: So, that's—that's where that— 
MR. SAUNDERS: But he didn't qualify at that time. 
MR. DAVIS: No. 
MR. LAKER: Because of this pending case. 
MR. DAVIS: Because of this charge, yes. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
5 
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THE CLERK: It's a retail theft, he was sentenced 
before you on November 18th. of '08, and sentenced to court 
probation. 
• THE COURT: Okay. And for what period of time? 
THE CLERK: Probation ends November 15, 2011. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, a three-year court probation. 
That was—oh, and all — all — the only condition was 
probably to follow what Judge Morris had ordered, I'm 
assuming. 
MR. LAKER: Well, and what — and what Judge Morris 
and the Davis County Court, they gave him a year. 
THE COURT: Thinking he would go into drug court. 
Okay. 
MR. LAKER: They gave him a year because of this 
pending case. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, that's probably why there's 
not an affidavit there, there's—he couldn't—while he's on 
court probation, so, I guess it would be your office that 
would file it, but it kinda doesn't make sense because he was 
ordered to do drug court, which he didn' t—ended up not 
qualifying for. 
But we probably do need to something with that case 
to get it back on track, 'cause it — 
MR. LAKER: And when he did plead in—in--on this, 
he—the State recommended concurrent sentencing with Davis 
6 • 
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County. 
MR. SAUNDERS: That's correct, we did recommend that 
it — this run concurrently with Davis County. We didn't agree 
to recommend that whatever their sentence was, it would be the 
sentence we'd recommend in this case. 
THE COURT: Right. Okay. 
MR. LAKER: But they did recommend a year and he's 
serving a year now, your Honor, which would be longer than, 
probably actual time would probably serve longer than he would 
if you followed the recommendations and sent him to prison. 
THE COURT: Well, but that's where this 
recommendation had me a bit confused, in that this 
recommendation recommends prison. 
MR. LAKER: I know. 
THE COURT: And the one that they had two months 
ago, which was by the same probation officer and that 
probation officer, knowing of this pending charge, recommended 
probation. 
MR. LAKER: And--and I don't under--I don't 
understand that at all, either, because this charge actually 
pre-dates--
MR. SAUNDERS: The matrix changed, the matrix 
changed, that's probably why, 'cause the matrix, I think, in 
this one, recommended imprisonment. 
THE COURT: It does. 
7 
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MR. SAUNDERS: And--and that—the matrix changes 
with each conviction. So, that's why.' 
THE COURT: But—but he would have known that, 
that's the only thing— 
• MR. SAUNDERS: It doesn't matter, because the old 
matrix didn't recommend prison. 
THE COURT: It just seems odd to kind of get him 
started in a program and then two months later, recommend 
against it, but I--I— 
MR. SAUNDERS: But—but he was on probation— 
. THE COURT: That is what's happened, you're right. 
MR. DAVIS: I do apologize, your Honor, I wasn't 
able to enter it because I think it would have been a good 
opportunity for me and I need help. 
THE COURT: It would have been good, yeah. Okay. 
Your thoughts, Mr. Laker, then? 
MR. LAKER: Your Honor, I would ask your Honor to-— 
to do what--what we anticipated, what Mr. Bouwhuis 
anticipated, that you run this concurrent with the sentence 
out of Davis County and that is that he serve a year, that he-
-he be given credit for the time that he's served and--and 
then get into the programs that they're contemplating there. 
' THE COURT: And—and what do we do about the court 
probation case that — that we have in this Court? 
MR. LAKER: Well, I--I would think that that would--
8 
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that would be something that would go concurrent with it as 
well. 
THE COURT: Okay. And does he agree with the amount 
of restitution recommended here? 
MR. LAKER: The restitution is— 
. THE COURT: Twenty-nine ninety eight. 
MR. LAKER: --twenty-nine--yeah. Twenty-nine ninety 
eight, we don't have a problem with that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Mr. Davis, anything you would like to say before 
sentence is imposed? 
MR. DAVIS: Yes, your Honor. I just want you to 
know I do apologize for not entering the program, I think it 
would have been a good opportunity for me. A lot has happened 
since then with these past months in jail, to say the least 
it's pretty frustrating and I brought this upon myself and I 
can't blame anyone but myself, but I mean, I've written . 
letters to all my friends, telling them not to write me, don't 
call my house, I can't continue living that lifestyle, I don't 
want nothing to do with it, I just (inaudible) that I meant 
for, just I want to get this over with and get on with my 
life. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Mr. Saunders? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, we think the 
9 
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recommendation for prison is appropriate. He's been given the 
change of probation before and was terminated unsuccessfully. 
At the time, after he committed the offense that 
he's apparently on court probation for, he committed this 
offense, so, he just keeps committing offenses, even when hefs 
been charged and on probation for other offenses. 
We think that the-—the appropriate recommendation in 
this case is prison, your Honor. 
MR. LAKER: But this pre-dates, your Honor, the--the 
actual being on probation for that. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
COURT 
LAKER 
COURT 
LAKER 
COURT 
LAKER: 
DAVIS-
: The—the date of— 
It happened— 
The date of the offense-
The date--
—was prior to that. 
Correct. 
Apparently in 2007, too, that probation 
was revoked and re-started with a zero tolerance condition. 
THE COURT: Which one was that?. Was that the one 
here? 
MR. SAUNDERS: It's a 021701125. 
THE COURT: You!d better look at up. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Yeah. If I'm reading this correct, 
it was started in 2002--
THE COURT: Can you look that one up? 
10 
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MR. SAUNDERS: —and in 2005, it was revoked—oh, 
no, let's see. He was convicted. In 2005, he was con— 
(inaudible) serve 24 months' probation, that probation was 
revoked, been sentenced anew, committed anew. . 
If you read on Page 6, that's where I'm getting that 
information, of the addendum. 
THE COURT: And where does it say zero tolerance? 
MR. DAVIS: That second paragraph. In 2007, the 
defendant violated his probation, his probation is revoked and 
re-started with zero tolerance. 
Wow. Is that what it says? 
Y e a h . •• .. 
Oh, we're—I'm sorry. We're looking at 
THE COURT; 
MR. DAVIS: 
. THE CLERK: 
Case No. 2182? 
THE COURT: No. 1125. That doesn't look like one 
of ours. I think that's a Davis County case. 
• MR. SAUNDERS: I'm just trying to go through — that' s 
a Davis County case. 
MR. LAKER: That's a Davis County, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. ' ' ". 
MR. SAUNDERS: So,--
THE COURT: Never mind. 
. MR. SAUNDERS: — I can't find the one that he's on 
court probation here for. 
THE COURT: That zero tolerance threw me. 
11 
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Okay. Anything else from the State? 
MR. SAUNDERS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Laker, anything else from your 
standpoint? 
MR. LAKER: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any legal reason why sentence 
cannot be imposed? 
MR. LAKER: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. I111 do the following, Mr. Davis. 
In connection with your conviction of a third-degree felony, 
retail theft, that you be sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
for one indeterminate term of zero to five years and that you 
pay restitution in the amount of $29.98 to 7-Eleven. You may 
have credit for the time that you've served and that may run 
concurrent with any other sentence that you are serving.. 
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Davis. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Are you sending him to prison 
currently, your Honor, instead of the—the 365 days? 
THE COURT: Yes. Yeah. I think the probation 
hasn't been successful and it's been tried many times. 
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I would ask that if--I mean, 
when I--you know, I say that (inaudible) drug court program, 
there was no--never given the opportunity, I couldn't qualify 
because this was pending. 
THE COURT: Well, that's — that's not what I'm 
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counting as unsuccessful, it's the other probation attempts 
that you've had. 
MR. DAVIS: Out of Davis County? 
THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). 
MR. DAVIS: Well, I want you to know, your Honor, I 
won't let you down, I — I won't. 
MR. LAKER: If you'll give him an opportunity, your 
Honor. 
MR. DAVIS: I—if you'll give me the opportunity, I 
won't let you down. I am so committed right now, I — I — 
MR. SAUNDERS: We have no rec—we have no objection 
to the Court recommending drug board, your Honor, if you feel 
like that's appropriate. 
THE COURT: I—I'm fine with that, recommending drug 
board at the prison, but I think the recommendation is well- • 
founded, Mr. Davis. I'm sorry. 
MR. DAVIS: There's no possibility of—I mean, after 
staying the past five months in jail, just — a lot has changed. 
I mean, I don't use — you've probably heard a lot of this same 
type of thing, but I mean, I'm just—I've cut all my ties, 
I've just — I !ve written letters to friends saying that if 
you're going to continue living this lifestyle, I don't want 
nothing to do with you. I mean, I —I've just—I've made a lot 
of changes to myself, I really have. And I just—when I was 
given that opportunity to go to drug court, I was excited, I 
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really was. I was like, I knew it was a good opportunity for 
me and when I—when I wasn't able to qualify, I just — I was 
kind of in limbo, I guess I didn't know— 
THE COURT: Well, and you don't get—about the only 
other opportunity I have to give to you as far as drug 
treatment is drug board and so that's—that's what I hope you 
get. 
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Davis. 
MR. DAVIS: So, there's no other —no other 
possibility from you, sir? 
THE COURT: I don't see it, Mr. Davis. I think the-
-I think the recommendation is well-founded, it makes sense to 
me. 
MR. DAVIS: It makes sense to you? . 
THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). I'm sorry. I 
hope you do well. 
Other matters, Mr. Laker? 
MR. LAKER: No, your Honor, I—that's all I had. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
• * * 
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